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ARTICLE

Legislating Religious Freedom: An Example
of Muslim Marriages in South Africa
†

WAHEEDA AMIEN AND ANNIE LEATT (DHAMMAMEGHĀ)

††

INTRODUCTION
For the past 27 years, diverse groups of Muslims have lobbied
for the legalization of Muslim marriages in South Africa and for the
codification of elements of Muslim Personal Law (MPL). MPL is an
Islamic-based private law system comprising family law and
inheritance. Perhaps surprisingly, certain ulamā bodies (Muslim
religious bodies or clergy)1 and gender activists have supported draft
legislation for the recognition of Muslim marriages under the
enabling provisions of the final Constitution of South Africa 1996,
though for quite different reasons. Yet, despite successive proposals,
widespread consultation within the Muslim community, and two draft
Muslim marriage bills, Muslim marriages are still not recognized in
South Africa.
This contribution presents some background to efforts to
recognize Muslim marriages and provides an overview of elements of
the 2010 Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB) currently under
consideration. The contribution places recognition efforts in the
context of an internally diverse Muslim community. It also lays out
some important resources for understanding what is at stake in the
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Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town.
†† B.Soc Sci Hons (Cape Town); M.A. (Cape Town); M.A. (UCSB); Ph.D.
(Wits). Postdoctoral fellow, Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research
(WiSER), University of the Witwatersrand.
1. Ulamā literally means “learned ones,” and it refers to a body of Muslim
clergy. They usually include men trained in the seminaries of the Middle East, the
India-Pakistan subcontinent, and locally. Ebrahim Moosa, Shaping Muslim Law in
South Africa: Future and Prospects, in THE OTHER LAW: NON-STATE ORDERING IN
SOUTH AFRICA 125, 125 (Wilfried Schärf & Daniel Nina eds., 2001).
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recognition of Muslim marriages, and why, despite considerable
effort, this has not yet been possible in South Africa.
In doing so, we seek to highlight some of the tensions involved
in an effort that seeks to afford legal recognition to a religious
marriage within a secular legal framework. We ask: how it is possible
to develop law that adjudicates equality between religious groups in a
newly secular society, and equality between different members of
religious communities, particularly between Muslim men and
women? We address the question of authority and choice within a
religious community: how can law work with tensions between
individuals and religious leaders as interpreters and active agents of
religiously sanctioned marriages? What constitutes a religious
community? A legal specialist? An appropriate arbiter and a
spokesperson for the religious tradition? And how, in a country like
South Africa with multiple and parallel marriage legislation, do legal
drafters engage with tensions between religious and secular
interpretations of marriage in the context of a Bill of Rights?
The draft legislation on Muslim marriages raises complex
questions about representation, interpretation, and equality in
attempts to enact religious freedom in law in a secular and liberal
context. It shows how law-making is at once both a legal and social
process. And it demonstrates that law making is not only about the
recognition of religious mores and sanctions, but also about its
reformulation through codification and arbitration. The contribution
therefore provides background, resources, commentary, and extracts
from the South African Constitution and draft legislation on Muslim
marriages to study as a case for the politics of religious freedom.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY
AFRICA

OF

RELIGION, POLITICS,

AND

RULE

IN

SOUTH

South Africa is the site of a long and complex history of
entanglement between religion, tradition, and political rule. Until the
transition of the 1990s, South Africa was not secular. Despite their
many differences, successive regimes of white colonial and apartheid
government made use of Christian political theologies and traditional
authority to secure white rule without democratic legitimacy.
South Africa is furthermore a country with significant religious
diversity and high levels of religious adherence. In addition to the
religiosity of precolonial Southern Africa and the Christianity
introduced by Europeans and missionaries, political prisoners, slaves,
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indentured labourers, and people fleeing persecution brought a range
of religions to Southern Africa.2 Demographic data on religion in
South Africa is thin. The best source is the 2001 Census.3 According
to this data, Christianity is by far the biggest religion, with
approximately 78% adherence. Christian religiosity is very diverse
and can be aggregated under mainline Protestant, Reformed, Roman
Catholic, African Independent, and Pentecostal Charismatic
Churches. Fifteen percent of the population report that they have “no
religion.” In 2001, Muslims made up about 1.5% of the South
African population or around 650,000 people. They therefore
comprise the biggest religious minority.4 There were also 550,000
Hindus and about 75,000 Jews. A catch-all category of “other faiths,”
including “Buddhist Taoist, New Age, Jehovah’s Witness and
Baha’i” was selected by nearly 300,000 people. Furthermore,
126,000 people identified as having “African Traditional Belief,” and
1.4% of the population refused to answer the religion question.5
During the colonial period, the policy of indirect rule was
introduced for the indigenous African population who comprised the
majority of South Africans living in what were first called reserves
and then “homelands.”6 They were permitted to live only under a
self-governing system in those homelands, which made up a
miniscule fraction of the land area of the country. During that
process, African customary practices were codified as Customary
Law by British administrators from 1878.
Other systems of law—including those adhered to by Muslims,
Hindus and Jews—were left to operate in a parallel and private
sphere. Where “non-Christian” systems of law appeared in public
2. FUNSO S. AFOLAYAN, CULTURE & CUSTOMS OF SOUTH AFRICA 57–83
(2004) (setting out the various religious influences in South Africa). Cf.
CHRISTIANITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL HISTORY
(Richard Elphick & Rodney Davenport eds., 1997) (charting the history of
Christian influences in South Africa).
3. See STATISTICS S. AFR., CENSUS 2001: PRIMARY TABLES SOUTH AFRICA:
CENSUS ’96 AND 2001 COMPARED 24–28 (2001),
available at
http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/RSAPrimary.pdf (reporting the census
results pertaining to religion). Questions about religion have since been taken out of
the Census instruments.
4. All figures for the “minority religions” should be treated with caution since
sampling errors are likely to be greatest where the population proportion is so low
and where migrants and foreign nationals were considerably undercounted.
5. STATISTICS S. AFR., supra note 3, at 24–25. Calculations were done by Leatt
using simple descriptive statistical techniques.
6. J.C. MEYERS, INDIRECT RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA: TRADITION, MODERNITY
AND THE COSTUMING OF POLITICAL POWER 1–16 (2008).
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debates, they became subject to a Calvinist form of moralizing
around gender and polygyny. In fact, the state did not recognize
Muslim marriages because, being potentially polygynous, they were
not held to conform to the “Christian requisite of monogamy.”7
In many respects, religious and racial discrimination overlapped
in South African history. Religious leaders took part in racial
governance as well as in opposition. In 1948, the National Party (NP)
came to power in a whites-only election and introduced the policy of
apartheid with racial segregation and legally codified white
domination.8 In 1960, 69 black people in a rally protesting the
infamous pass laws were reportedly shot by the police in the
Sharpeville Massacre.9 The white referendum that was then proposed
by the NP led to a declaration of independence from Britain.
Afterwards, the South African state was more able to pursue its racist
policies unhindered. During that decade, the apartheid state reached
the height of its powers and ambitions.10 The government launched a
concerted campaign against political opposition by the African
National Congress (ANC), the Black Consciousness movement, and
the Pan African Congress. It also took control over many of the
previously mission run schools and instituted Christian National
Education, which differentiated curriculum, teacher training, and
school resources by race according to the apartheid classifications:
Black, Coloured, Indian, and White. Some privately-funded Jewish
and Muslim schools were established to provide an alternative.
However, on the whole, Hindu and Muslim children were educated in
a Christian context in Coloured and Indian schools. The political
theology of apartheid revolved around a Christian God that
differentiated between the country’s inhabitants by race and culture.
7. In Ismail v. Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A), the Supreme Court during the
apartheid era confirmed that Muslim marriages were precluded from legal
recognition because their potentially polygynous nature offended the public policy
or boni mores of that time, which was informed by a Christian ethos. Waheeda
Amien, Overcoming the Conflict between the Right to Freedom of Religion and
Women’s Rights to Equality: A South African Case Study of Muslim Marriages. 28
HUM. RTS. Q. 729, 733 (2006) (quoting Ismail v. Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (AD) at
1024E, 1025G (S. Afr.)).
8. LEONARD M. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 87–90 (2000).
9. Id. at 210; WILLIAM BEINART, TWENTIETH CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA 166–67
(2001).
10. E.g., Deborah Posel, The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA: 1885-1994 319–68. (Robert Ross et al.,
eds., 2011).

2014]

LEGISLATING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

509

The preamble of the 1961 Constitution quite literally asserted that
God gave South Africa to whites: White responsibility to God was to
stand united to safeguard “the integrity of the country,” secure “law
and order,” and “further the contentment and spiritual and material
welfare of all in our midst.”11
Increased repression led to increased struggle against the state.
Opposition groups radicalized, established bases in exile, and some
took up armed struggle. Within the country, youth protest increased.
The 1976 Soweto Uprising was a response to the plan to introduce
Afrikaans as the medium of instruction for black African children.12
The state’s actions became increasingly extreme with bannings,
arrests, and extra-judicial killings.13 In the 1980s, successive states of
emergency were declared in which police and security apparatuses
gained almost unfettered freedom to act against opponents of the
state.14 As more political leaders of the opposition were banned,
incarcerated, killed, or went into exile, religious leaders took up more
public roles in the struggle. Archbishop Tutu and the Reverand Allan
Boesak are probably the best known of these, though they were part
of a broader progressive ANC-aligned interfaith movement that
participated in the United Democratic Front (UDF). Muslim leaders
also participated in the struggle against apartheid, notably Imam
Abdullah Haron who was murdered by the apartheid state in 1969.
The Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), which continues to function
today as a progressive Muslim-based organization in South Africa,
was also active in the struggle against apartheid.15
While military and police repression increased, the apartheid
state strategically increased its divide and rule efforts among black
people by introducing the Tricameral Parliament in 1983.16 The
Tricameral Parliament was an attempt to co-opt Coloured and Indian
leaders into “power-sharing” by giving them representation in second
class houses of parliament while maintaining a white majority in the
main house. Black Africans were excluded from this initiative. The
11. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. CONST., Apr. 24, 1961, Act 32 of 1961, pmbl.
12. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 212; HERMANN BUHR GILIOMEE & BERNARD
MBENGA, NEW HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 362–63 (2007).
13. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 212–13.
14. See id. at 236 (“South Africa’s destabilizing tactics between 1980 and 1989
led to the deaths of one million people [and] made a further three million
homeless.”).
15. About Us, MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT,
http://mym.za.org/index.php/about-us.html (last visited May 8, 2014).
16. MARINA OTTAWAY, SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ORDER
24–25 (1993).

510

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:505

black majority comprising black African, Coloured, and Indian
people protested against the establishment of the Tricameral
Parliament and boycotted its elections. They saw the initiative for
what it was: another attempt to manipulate black South Africans.
Consequently, the tricameral elections inspired “only 13 and 18
percent voter turnout respectively,”17 and as result, some Hindu and
Muslim people were present for the first time in lower houses of
parliament. Given that, the 1983 South African Constitution of the
apartheid government sought to acknowledge some equivalence of
religions under the authorization of the Christian God. This was
incorporated into an utterly incoherent statement that speaks of
responsibility towards God and man, and the necessity of pursuing
national goals of upholding “Christian values and civilized norms,
with recognition and protection of freedom of faith and worship” and
the “self-determination of population groups and peoples.”18
In 1987, in the context of the abovementioned dual strategy of
the apartheid state, the South African Law Commission (SALC)
initiated an investigation into Muslim marriages. Ulamā bodies in
South Africa had occasionally lobbied for legal recognition of MPL
under apartheid. While some of the ulamā supported the work of the
SALC, many Muslims affiliated with the anti-apartheid struggle, such
as the MYM and anti-apartheid activist members of the ulamā, were
suspicious of the initiative.19 Hence, nothing further came of that
attempt.
II. CONSTITUTING SECULARISM IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa is rightly famous for its negotiated transition during
which apartheid and opposition forces reached agreements that
encouraged the National Party (NP) to step down and the African
National Congress (ANC) to assume power. The negotiations took
the form of agreements on practical arrangements for government
and drafting a new Constitution. The new Constitution captured the
aspirations for democracy, representation, and equality, and it also
safeguarded cultural and linguistic rights, private property and
business, and financial stability. Although covert military and
17. BEINART, supra note 9, at 255.
18. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. CONST., Sept. 22, 1983, Act 110 of 1983, pmbl.
19. See Ebrahim Moosa, Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa: A History
and Recent Developments, in 3 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 130, 135 (1996)
(noting that many within the Muslim community suspected that purchasing
legitimacy was the SALC’s motivation for the initiative).
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policing operations continued during this time, the transition was able
to prevent the escalation of the violence of the 1980s into a full scale
civil war.
Everything was up for negotiation, and the legal and political
status of religion changed dramatically during the transition period.
The 1996 South African Constitution is now secular in as much as it
promises the right to religious freedom and religious equality and
makes legal provision for the relationships between state and religion.
It has destroyed the edifice of Christian political theology and the
unique place Christianity had under apartheid. It also offers the
promise of dignity, recognition, and the protection and exercise of
religious freedom for all South Africans. What this means in practice
is still being worked out in society, law, and jurisprudence.
The rights entrenched in the new Constitution are basically
liberal in form; they are mainly oriented to the rights of individuals.
The various conglomerations of apartheid power—the NP, those
further to the right of Afrikaner politics, and some of the leaders of
homelands—all sought protection for group rights under the rubric of
consociationalism and group, rather than individual, political
representation. As a second prize, they were willing to accept a
strongly federal arrangement that retained some special race
majorities in certain areas. The ANC in contrast was set on winning
the basic rights of representative democracy with one person one
vote. They sought a dispensation in which citizens would be
recognized as having political equality in a state that could work to
secure social and economic equality. To do so, they prioritized
individual rights in legal drafting and negotiations, even as they
furthered the rhetoric of people’s power on the streets. The liberal
aspirations are largely captured in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights,
sections of which are discussed below.
In the transition, religion was not a particularly contentious
issue. Debates about the future of religion were held between the
ANC, NP, and other smaller parties, and they were informed by an
interfaith body through the World Conference on Religion and Peace
(WCRP) that coordinated submissions and perspectives from a wide
range of progressive Christian and Muslim groups. In addition, many
religious individuals or groups wrote to the Constitutional Assembly
or lobbied the parties to the negotiations. On the whole, there was
considerable consensus within the formal negotiating process about
the importance of recognizing religious diversity, the principle of
freedom of religion, and the significance of religious practice to most
South Africans.
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There are a number of areas in which legal provisions about
religion are found in the Constitution. The bedrock of these are
contained inter alia in the equality provision (section 9), the
individual right to freedom of religion (section 15), and the collective
right to freedom of religion (section 31).
The equality provision states:
9 (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the
right to equal protection and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of
all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement
of equality, legislative and other measures designed to
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status,
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or
directly against anyone on one or more grounds in
terms of subsection (3).
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds
listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established
that the discrimination is fair.20
Importantly, section 9(3) promises protection from
discrimination on the basis of religion and belief, as well as on the
basis of sex, gender, and sexuality. As in most constitutional
dispensations with a Bill of Rights, potentially conflicting rights and
protections are enshrined. For instance, the collective right to
freedom of religion in section 31 can potentially conflict with section
9(3). As we will show, this conflict is illustrated in the Muslim
Marriages Bill (MMB). Section 31 reads:
31 (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or
linguistic community may not be denied the right,
with other members of that community –
20. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9.
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(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion
and use their language; and,
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural,
religious and linguistic associations and other
organs of civil society.
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised
in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill
of Rights.21
Significantly, section 31(2) will most likely provide the balance
needed to prevent a discriminatory religious practice from being
lawfully sanctioned. It appears to create the potential to subordinate
religious rights to, for example, equality. For instance, a practice
authorized by a sacred text or religious authority that discriminates
unfairly on the basis of gender, sex, or sexuality, will most likely not
be upheld in the event of a court challenge.
The transition founded a new political community that was,
for the first time, not racially legislated. Many of the events and
symbols of the nation-building that accompanied the transition were
secular in form and content. They included ushering in the new
Constitution, the 1994 elections, the inauguration of Nelson Mandela,
and his personification of inclusive reconciliation. Where religious
leaders were present at important ceremonial events to found the new
nation, including Mandela’s inauguration and the opening of the first
democratic Parliament, great care was taken to have those events
blessed by religious leaders from a wide range of faiths and
denominations.
Yet, the rhetorical and performative creation of a national
community also required some sort of revisiting of the past. It is in
relation to this most painful and antagonistic past that Christianity, as
the majority religion and as a common language of reconciliation,
was brought into use in the political process. In the process of the
Truth and Reconcialiation Commission (TRC) and in nation-building
discourse, Christian notions of reconciliation, liberation, and
forgiveness were mobilized. In fact, given the largely Christian
population in South Africa, themes and images from Christianity
continue to infuse public and political culture.
While section 31 protects the collective right of “persons
belonging to a religious community” to “practice their religion” and
21. Id. § 31.
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“form, join and maintain religious associations,” section 15 protects
the individual right to freedom of religion. Section 15, which is titled
“Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion,” includes three sections.22
The first was introduced early in the negotiation process and was
maintained in the 1996 Constitution as a general formulation of the
right to religion. Section 15 (1) states, “Everyone has the right to
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”23
The technical legal drafting teams in 1993 noted that all parties
agreed that religion formed part of a basic set of first generation
rights that were “minimal or essential rights and freedoms.”24
Recognized as comprising an international rights standard, it formed
common ground among the main negotiating parties.
Unlike in the United States, however, the negotiating parties in
South Africa conceived a relationship of cooperation between state
and religious groups. They decided against a strict wall of separation
between religious and state institutions. Political and religious groups
agreed that their institutions should be separated for their mutual and
common good, but that separation should not be so strict as to
preclude their cooperation or the presence of religious observance in
state and state-aided institutions.
Very different rationales informed this consensus. Some were
explicitly religious, others political. All parties agreed that South
Africa is a religious country, that there is religious diversity, and that,
unlike in the past, there must be a place for all religions in the new
society.25 They also agreed that the area of operation of religious
institutions should not be less than that of Calvinist Christianity under
apartheid. Religious clergy and observance should still be present in
22. Id. § 15.
23. Id. § 15(1).
24. See TECHNICAL COMM. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DURING THE
TRANSITION, SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL
COMMITTEE ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION 2–5 (May 14, 1993),
available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3201.PDF (including “Freedom of
conscience, religion, thought and belief” in the category of “Minimal or essential
rights and freedoms which must be accommodated”).
25. E.g. Nat’l Party, National Party Preliminary Submission to Theme
Committee
Four
on
Freedom
of
Religion,
CONSTITUTIONNET,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3016.PDF (last visited June 28, 2014); Afr.
Christian Democratic Party, African Christian Democratic Party Submission to
Theme Committee Four on Freedom of Religion, CONSTITUTIONNET,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3006.PDF (last visited June 28, 2014).
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schools, prisons, hospital chaplaincies, and in public broadcasting.
However, the terms of their presence were altered to include the full
range of religions. By consensus, institutional Christianity lost its
monopoly on the state and state-aided institutions. This was
formulated in the following way in the 1996 Constitution:
15 (2) Religious observances may be conducted at
state or state-aided institutions, provided that –
(a) those observances follow rules made by the
appropriate public authorities;
(b) they are conducted on an equitable basis,
and;
(c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.26
Prior to the enactment of the 1996 Constitution, there was
some debate about who should have the authority to determine the
rules for religious co-existence and practice in state institutions. In
draft form, section 15(2)(a) referred only to “appropriate
authorities.”27 A Constitutional Assembly Public Hearing in May
1995 provided a chance for religious groups to elaborate on who
would have such authority.28 The overwhelming consensus among
religious groups, endorsed by the WCRP, was that religious bodies
should retain autonomy over religious observances, even when they
were in state institutions. Religious bodies envisaged an interlocutory
interfaith body, controlled by religious groups, which could advise
government on religious matters.
Religious groups had no leverage over the decision on an
appropriate authority when it was finally made. In April 1996, at the
very end of the negotiations, the ANC and the NP met to negotiate
deadlocked issues in bilateral conversation.29 The NP wanted to make
sure that, in schools particularly, the appropriate authority would be
the school governing body.30 They hoped to retain the Christian
26. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 15(2).
27. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 § 13.
28. S. Afr. Constitutional Assembly Public Hearing on Religion (1995)
(transcipt on file at S. Afr. Nat’l Archives CA F4 1/12/6).
29. See PENELOPE ANDREWS, THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS:
PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA’S BASIC LAW 169–71 (2001) (describing the
private, bilateral negotiating process).
30. NAT’L PARTY, PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION ITEM 14: SOCIO ECONOMIC
RIGHTS (N.D.) (on file with S. Afr. National Archives, CA 2/4/4/1/7/13) (“With
regard to the rules for religious observances referred to in section 14(2), we wish to
emphasise that the ‘appropriate authority’ that may issue them should be the
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character of some schools, which could be done if the majority of
learners and members of the school governing bodies were Christian
or even a specific denomination of Christianity. On their insistence,
the phrasing of the religion clause was altered to read “the
appropriate public authorities.”
The third section to the right to freedom of religion in the 1996
Constitution was included after direct lobbying by ulamā groups
during the constitutional negotiation process. It is this provision that
provides the enabling legislation for the MMB under discussion:
15(3) (a) This section does not prevent legislation
recognising –
(i) marriages concluded under any
tradition, or a system of religious,
personal or family law; or
(ii) systems of personal or family law
under any tradition, or adhered to by
persons professing a particular religion.
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must
be consistent with this section and the other
provisions of the Constitution.31
Sections 15, 31 and 9(3) emerged from the political process as
the trilogy of constitutional provisions that, among others, gave a new
place to religion in South Africa. In other words, constitutionally,
they gave religion its place through the individual right to religion,
equal recognition of religions, and non-discrimination on the grounds
of religion. At the same time, like section 31, section 15(3), which
affords parliament discretion to pass legislation to recognize among
others religious marriages, also creates the possibility of
subordinating religious practices to equality. As a result,
discriminatory religious practices that are included within the
legislation may not withstand constitutional scrutiny. In South Africa,
we have not yet had occasion to test this theory since legislation
aimed at recognizing religious marriages has not yet been enacted.
However, we do have draft legislation proposing to recognize
Muslim marriages in accordance with section 15(3). In the next two
governing body of the institution in question and that, if need be, this should be
stipulated in the constitution.”)
31. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 15(3).
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sections, we discuss that legislation in more detail and provide the
background that led to its formulation.
III.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND THE HISTORY
OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MUSLIM MARRIAGES BILL

A large part of the South African Muslim community is not
indigenous to Africa. Their ancestors were brought to South Africa
from the seventeenth century as slaves, indentured labourers, political
prisoners, convicts, and traders from various parts of the world
including South Asia, South-East Asia, and Africa.32 The large
majority of South African Muslims follow the Sunni tradition with a
small number adhering to the Shi’i tradition.33 As a result of their
origins, most Muslims in South Africa were classified by the
apartheid state as Coloured and Indian, and many are still located
within those historically racially disadvantaged communities.34
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a rising number of black
Africans converting to Islam in South Africa and an increasing
number of Muslims are also located in immigrant communities
entering South Africa from other parts of Africa. To a much lesser
extent, converts to Islam can further be found in the white South
African community.
Under British colonialism, Muslims could only practise Islam
and regulate their religious personal laws within the private sphere
because any public display of their religion was proscribed and
punishable by death, though this was not actively enforced.35 It is not
surprising, given how long Muslims have been in South Africa, that
there are those within the community who organized themselves into
ulamā bodies and assumed the authority to pronounce on everything
related to Islam. Ulamā bodies have appropriated a quasi-judicial
function that enables them to preside over disputes emanating from
the Muslim community including those involving marriage and
divorce. The biggest ulamā body in South Africa is the Sunni-based
United Ulamā Council of South Africa (UUCSA), which was formed
in 1994 and represents about 400 mosques, 200 Muslim educational

32. Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J. L. &
RELIGION 185, 211 (2001).
33. Moosa, supra note 19, at 131.
34. Waheeda Amien, Reflections on the Recognition of African Customary
Marriages in South Africa: Seeking Insights for the Recognition of Muslim
Marriages, 13 ACTA JURIDICA COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 357, 359 (2013).
35. G.J. van Niekerk, Legal Pluralism, in INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
PLURALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 8–9 (J.C. Bekker et al., eds., Durban 2006).
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institutions, and 1350 Muslim theologians across the country.36 It is
an umbrella body that comprises seven affiliates: the Jamiatul Ulamā
South Africa (established in 1923); the Muslim Judicial Council of
South Africa (MJC) (established in 1945); the Jamiatul Ulamā of
KwaZulu-Natal (established in 1955); the Sunni Jamiatul Ulamā of
South Africa (established in 1978); the Sunni Ulamā Council of
South Africa (established in 1992); the Eastern Cape Islamic
Congress (established in 1996); and the Council of Ulamā Eastern
Cape (established in 1999).37
While South African Muslims were eventually permitted to
practice their faith in the public domain, their religious personal laws
were never afforded legal recognition, mainly because the potentially
polygynous nature of their marriages did not conform to a Christian
understanding of marriage. The racial discrimination they suffered
was therefore integrally linked to religious discrimination. The call
by Muslims for Muslim Personal Law (MPL) to be recognized thus
emanates from a desire to have their dignity restored. However, other
motivating factors also drive different sections of the Muslim
community to advocate for the recognition of their personal laws. For
instance, many members of the ulamā wish to regulate MPL in a
legally enforceable manner and with the sanction of the state. While
their decisions carry moral weight within the Muslim community,
they are currently unenforceable. Gender activists also call for the
recognition of Muslim marriages but to provide protection to Muslim
women who are disparately affected by the non-recognition of their
marriages.38
In October 1993, just as the interim 1993 Constitution was being
finalized, Muslim groups made a series of submissions to the
Technical Committee responsible for drafting the Bill of Rights.39
This opened up the issue of MPL and its recognition in the new
Constitution. The Committee’s report noted that “[a]t a late stage of
36. About Us, UNITED ULAMA COUNCIL S. AFR., http://www.uucsa.net/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=3 (last visited May 8,
2014).
37. Id.
38. Waheeda Amien, A South African Case Study for the Recognition and
Regulation of Muslim Family Law in a Minority Muslim Secular Context, 24 INT’L
J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 361, 363 (2010).
39. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DURING TRANSITION,
TWELFTH PROGRESS REPORT (Nov. 15, 1993), available at http://www.constitution
net.org/files/3212.PDF.
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the negotiation process representatives of the Muslim community
made submissions . . . to the effect that the religious laws observed by
certain communities . . . should also be recognized constitutionally in
explicit terms.”40 Weeks of intense consultation followed. There were
two broad perspectives presented from the Muslim community. On
the one hand, the ulamā who initiated these representations argued
for the recognition of Islamic law and particularly its family law
elements. They also wanted the establishment of state funded or
administered religious courts to apply this law. They made several
arguments for this: recognition would provide redress for the second
class status of Islam in South Africa; it would sanction the marriages,
divorces, laws of succession and custody arrangements practiced by
most Muslims; and it would legitimize the work of the ulamā by
recognizing them and giving them access to non-voluntary modes of
redress for the contravention of their rulings through fines or
imprisonment. In the view of these members of the ulamā, Islamic
law is divinely sanctioned and should remain immune to the
intervention of secular or civil law. According to Moosa, they
“postured themselves as the sole authorities on MPL to the exclusion
of other sectors of the Muslim community.”41
A second perspective came from a broad alliance of progressive
Muslims who gathered in response to this proposal. This group
included some ulamā authorities, particularly from the MJC, as well
as Muslim community organizers, academics and women’s
representatives. According to one member of the drafting committee,
a submission by Ebrahim Moosa which was endorsed by a number of
Muslim groups42 tipped the balance in the decisions of the
Negotiating Council. Moosa’s submission clearly summarizes the
issues of this more progressive perspective.
Moosa’s submission acknowledged the widespread de facto
practice of MPL in South Africa, which was (and still is) informally
administered by various Muslim jurists. Moosa wrote that “[i]t is
known that most Muslims would prefer to follow the dictates of their
religion in matters of personal law, rather than secular law.”43 Given
40. Id.
41. Moosa, supra note 1, at 128.
42. Urgent Memorandum on Muslim Personal Law to Technical Committee
(Nov. 2, 1993) (on file with the Univ. Cape Town Hugh Corder Collection). The
memorandum was sent on Department of Religious Studies, University of Cape
Town letterhead. The memorandum was endorsed by the Judicial Committee of the
Islamic Council of South Africa, the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa,
Majlis as-Shura al-Islami, Call of Islam and the Central Islamic Trust.
43. Id.
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the fact that MPL did in fact guide many Muslims’ family relations,
its non-recognition was problematic. Moosa’s main concern was that
MPL as administered outside the ambit of the secular court system
disadvantaged women.44 Practices he identified as problematic on the
grounds of gender inequality include divorce by repudiation (talāq)
and limited maintenance provisions.45
Unlike the ulamā submissions, progressive Muslims highlighted
the diversity of schools of Islamic interpretation and Muslim cultural
practices in South Africa. For this reason, it was impossible they said,
to simply recognize any one self-appointed authority on Islamic law.
This was a matter that required wide debate across the Muslim
community, and that debate should always include women.46 Moosa
suggested that the outcome of those discussions should be the
codification of MPL.47 Such codification, which was “imperative,”
would provide the Muslim community with a chance to reform their
practices and bring them into line with human rights norms,
particularly around gender. Progressive Muslims argued that a similar
codification in Tunisia had been conducted in ways that entrench
gender equality that is true to Islam: “It is accepted that a human
rights dispensation is in full accord with Islamic law.”48
Some of the conservative ulamā’s demands are absent from
section 15(3) of the 1996 Constitution. The submission about courts
was deemed too specific for a transitional constitution and beyond the
technical committee’s remit.49 The ANC also made it clear that the
recognition of personal and family laws should only take place
“within the framework of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights.”50 It
would, in other words, only recognize such law where it guaranteed
gender and other grounds for equality.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. This is itself a contentious proposition according to more conservative
interpretations of Islamic law in which the testimony of women is treated as less
reliable than that of men.
47. Urgent Memorandum on Muslim Personal Law to Technical Committee,
supra note 42.
48. Id.
49. They suggested that if this issue of religious courts was to be taken up at
all, it should be dealt with in the chapter on Traditional Authorities that was at the
time debating customary courts. This did not happen.
50. Urgent Memorandum on Muslim Personal Law to Technical Committee,
supra note 42.
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Section 15(3)(a) is the same as its concomitant provision in
section 14(3) of the 1993 Constitution with one exception. While the
latter did not prevent the legislation of marriages and systems of
personal and family law, the 1996 Constitution replaced the and with
or. The reason for this can be found in debates internal to the Muslim
community about who has the right to represent and interpret Islamic
legal thought. Subsequent to the enactment of the 1993 Constitution,
a Muslim Personal Law Board (MPLB) was established to draft
legislation to recognize MPL.51 Due to ideological differences
between the more progressive and conservative voices on the MPLB,
it disbanded within a year. Conservative members of the ulamā
represented on the MPLB believed that as a divinely sanctioned
system, MPL could not be subordinated to the Constitution. In
contrast, progressive members adopted the view that progressive
interpretations of MPL allowed it to be consistent with constitutional
provisions, including gender equality. Thus, a progressive approach
to MPL enabled the latter to be compatible with the Constitution so
there would be no need for subordination by one to the other.52 For
some years, this situation led to a deadlock, and no further action was
taken to make use of the Constitution’s enabling provision.
The process to recognize MPL was revived in 1999 when the
South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) appointed a
Project Committee to draft legislation in accordance with section
15(3)(a).53 This time their brief was to propose recognition to Muslim
marriages as opposed to a system of personal or family laws.
Members of the Project Committee were nominated through a public
process and comprised a majority of Muslims from among the
judiciary, legal profession, academia, and representatives of UUCSA.
After a period of four years of extensive consultation with the South
African Muslim community, the Project Committee submitted a
comprehensive report accompanied by a draft Muslim Marriages Bill
to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Development in 2003
51. Abdulkader Tayob, The Struggle over Muslim Personal Law in a RightsBased Constitution: A South African Case Study 22 RECHT VAN DE ISLAM 1, 3
(2005) (“In 1994, the government appointed a Muslim Personal Law Board to
propose a system of Islamic law . . . . The body consisted of members from both the
religious leadership and representatives from the youth organizations that were
active against apartheid. The Board collapsed by April 1995 when its members
could not reach agreement.”).
52. Id. at 3–6.
53. Waheeda Amien, The Muslim Marriages Bill: Is It the Answer to the
Dilemma of Non-Recognition of Muslim Marriages in South Africa? (2009),
http://www.engender.org.za/publications/WAmienMuslimViewsArticleMMB.pdf.
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(hereafter referred to as the 2003 MMB).54 Tayob suggests that the
process undertaken by the SALRC Project Committee proved to be
more successful than the efforts of the MPLB because of the
narrower focus on the recognition of marriages rather than the
broader object of codifying a whole system of personal or family
laws. This enabled the Project Committee to concentrate on the direct
needs of the Muslim community relating to marriage and divorce and
address those in draft legislation instead of getting bogged down by
the ideological differences that had plagued the MPLB.55 The
remarkable thing is that even though there was significant consensus
on the 2003 MMB, it languished in the Ministry amidst the perhaps
more urgent task of rewriting almost every piece of legislation in the
newly democratic state. Still, it is unclear why the Ministry did not
push for its enactment. Did it lack the political will to do so? Did it
expect 100% support from the Muslim community, given the
dissident voices of very conservative members of the ulamā who
rejected any type of state regulation of MPL as well as those
members of the Shi’i community who felt that their needs were not
catered for in a largely Sunni-favourable MMB? Was the Ministry
persuaded by gender activists within secular society that the MMB
should not be enacted unless it was 100% consistent with gender
equality?
Whatever the reason, no further progress was made for seven
years until a women’s rights NGO, the Women’s Legal Centre
(WLC), instituted an action in 2009, asking the Constitutional Court
to order the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to
enact legislation to recognize Muslim marriages.56 Although the
Court decided against the WLC because they had instituted the action
in the incorrect court, it did spur the Department to apply its mind to
the MMB. During 2010, without any further consultation, the
Department submitted an amended version of the MMB to Cabinet,
which subsequently approved it (hereafter referred to as the 2010
MMB).57 This meant that the MMB could formally enter the
54. See generally SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION ISLAMIC
MARRIAGES & RELATED MATTERS REP. (2003) [hereinafter SALRC REP.]
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj59_2003jul.pdf.
55. Tayob, supra note 51, at 6.
56. Women’s Legal Trust v. President of the Republic of South Africa, and
Others 2009 (6) SA 94 (CC) (S. Afr.).
57. Muslim Marriages Bill, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legisl
ation/bills/2010_muslim-marriages-bill.pdf [hereinafter 2010 MMB] (S.Afr.).
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parliamentary process for consideration by the Portfolio Committee
on Justice and Constitutional Development and the National
Assembly. However, four years later, this has still not happened.
The majority of the Muslim community, including members of
the ulamā and many gender activists, appeared to support the 2003
MMB even though it did not contain all their demands.58 The
majority of the ulamā were satisfied that the 2003 MMB was Sharī’a
compliant and gender activists who pushed for its enactment believed
that it would provide more protection for Muslim women than they
have in the absence of legislation. In contrast, those members of the
ulamā who supported the 2003 MMB withdrew their support for the
2010 version on the basis that amendments that were unilaterally
effected by the Department had rendered the MMB non-compliant
with Sharī’a. This has now brought the process to a halt and has
effectively reversed four years of work by the SALRC. However,
given the Ministry’s unenthusiastic treatment of the 2003 MMB, one
wonders if a retreat to the drawing board in relation to the 2010
MMB by all the relevant parties concerned would actually make a
difference. There is more work to be done to understand the
dynamics within the Department that have prevented the process
from reaching any kind of conclusion.
Having given some background to the creation of the MMB in
its two forms (2003 and 2010), we now turn to its contents and
examine how the drafters and Muslim activists sought to develop a
compromise position amidst the demands of the Constitution, various
forms of legal interpretation of MPL, and secular or civil forms of
marriage. This includes a more detailed description of the
controversial provisions in the 2010 MMB that seem to have halted
any possibility of its enactment. A synopsis of the genderproblematic provisions is also included.
IV. THE MUSLIM MARRIAGES BILL
The 2010 Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB) recommends that legal
recognition be afforded to Muslim marriages and proposes a
comprehensive framework that encompasses a mainly Sunni
paradigm for the regulation of Muslim family law. According to the
Preamble, the aim of the MMB is:

58. Waheeda Amien, Why Forsake Muslim Women? 42 THINKER 26, 27 (2012)
(“Although the [Muslim Marriages Bill 2003] did not meet all the demands of all
the role players, it was certainly a document that most felt that they could live
with.”).
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To make provision for the recognition of Muslim
marriages; to specify the requirements for a valid
Muslim marriage; to regulate the registration of
Muslim marriages; to recognize the status and
capacity of spouses in Muslim marriages; to regulate
the proprietary consequences of Muslim marriages; to
regulate the termination of Muslim marriages and the
consequences thereof; and to provide for matters
connected therewith.59
To a large extent, the MMB purports to recognize the majority of
characteristics associated with a traditional understanding of Sunni
marriages. For instance, in clause 1, it defines a Muslim marriage as
one that is “between a man and a woman contracted in accordance
with Islamic law only.”60
The MMB then defines Islamic law as “the law as derived from
the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah (Prophetic model), the consensus of
Muslim Jurists (Isma) and analogical deductions based on the
primary sources (Qiyas).”61
The MMB further provides the following definition of a
“Muslim” as “a person who believes in the oneness of Allah and who
believes in the Holy Messenger Muhammad as the final prophet and
who has faith in all the essentials of Islam.”62 Here we should note
that the definition of a Muslim is one that depends on individual
belief and faith rather than membership of a community or culture.
Through these definitions, the MMB excludes same-sex couples from
concluding a Muslim marriage that could be registered under the
MMB, even though South Africa legislates and recognizes same-sex
unions.63 It could also exclude those following the Shi’i tradition, and
the conclusion of a Shi’i-type mutah (temporary) marriage, which
would arguably not be recognized under the MMB. The drafters also
make the very questionable assumption that all Muslims agree on the
essentials of Islam.
The MMB further limits the sources of Islamic law to primary
and secondary sources. The exclusion of subsidiary sources is
59. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, at pmbl.
60. Id. at cl. 1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.) (noting that Civil Unions between
same-sex couples will be recognized under the law).
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problematic because that is where the greatest potential for the reform
of Islamic law lies. For example, maslahā (public interest), istihsān
(the discretion to relax a rule that could result in harm), ‘urf and ‘adat
(customs and practices followed within a community) are but a few
of the subsidiary sources of Islamic law. These sources enable greater
responsiveness to the lived social and economic realities of any
Muslim community. Without recognition of the subsidiary sources of
Islamic law, its interpretation and application will most likely
entrench existing conservative and male-centered understandings and
practices. The 2003 MMB did not contain a definition of Islamic law.
It is unclear why the Department would see fit to include a definition
in the 2010 MMB, particularly one as limiting as this. Had the
Department consulted about the proposed definition, it might have
realized the disastrous implications that a reductionist definition of
Islamic law could have for marginalized members of the Muslim
community.
Other features of a traditional Sunni understanding of Muslim
family law are incorporated into the 2010 MMB. These include the
consent of both parties (this is an especially Hanafī interpretation);
marriage by proxy should either party prefer that option; prompt and
deferred mahr (the dower payable by the husband to the wife);
nafaqah (a husband’s unilateral obligation to maintain his wife,
wives, and children, which includes separate residence for the wife in
the case of dissolution of the marriage while the children are in her
custody); polygyny (a husband being permitted to have multiple
wives); a wife’s right to be compensated for breastfeeding; a wife’s
right to be compensated for services rendered in her husband’s or his
family’s business; separate matrimonial property estates for the
spouses; the right of both spouses to be compensated for direct
contributions to the maintenance or growth of each other’s estates;
alternative dispute resolution preceding dissolution of the marriage;
iddah (the waiting period observed by the wife following dissolution
of the marriage by death or divorce); mut’ah al-talāq (compensation
owed to the wife when the marriage is dissolved at the unjustified
behest of the husband); and most of the different forms of dissolution
of a Muslim marriage that are available to men and women including
talāq (a husband’s unilateral right to repudiate his wife), tafwīd-altalāq (where a husband delegates his right of talāq to his wife),
khul’a (the dissolution of the marriage at the instance of the wife) and
faskh (a fault-based divorce available to men and women).64 The
grounds for faskh, which are listed in the 2010 MMB, are in fact
64. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, §§ 1, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12.
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similar to so-called secular or civil grounds for divorce found in
many western jurisdictions:
“Faskh” means a decree of dissolution of a marriage
granted by a court, upon the application of a husband
or wife, on any ground or basis permitted by Islamic
law, including, in the case of a wife, any one or more
of the following grounds, namely where (a) the husband is missing, or his whereabouts are
not known, for a substantial period of time (Mafqūd
al-Khabar);
(b) the husband fails to maintain his wife (Adam
al-Infāq);
(c) the husband has been sentenced to
imprisonment for a period of three years or more,
provided that the wife is entitled to apply for a decree
of the dissolution of the marriage within a period of
one year as from the date of sentencing;
(d) the husband is mentally ill, or in a state of
continued unconsciousness as provided for in section
5 of the Divorce Act, which provisions apply with the
changes required by the context (Junūn);
(e) the husband suffers from impotence or a
serious disease which renders cohabitation intolerable
(Ayb);
(f) the husband treats his wife with cruelty in any
form, which renders cohabitation intolerable (Dharar);
(g) the husband has failed, without valid reason,
to perform his marital obligations for an unreasonable
period (Dharar);
(h) the husband is a spouse in more than one
Muslim marriage and fails to treat his wife justly in
accordance with the injunctions of the Qur’an and
Sunnah (Dharar);
(i) the husband commits harm against his wife, as
recognized by Islamic law (Dharar); or
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(j) discord between the spouses has undermined
the objects of marriage, including the foundational
values of mutual love, affection, companionship and
understanding, with the result that the dissolution of
the marriage is an option in the circumstances
(Shiqāq).65
Members of the majority Sunni ulamā do not appear to have a
problem with the above formulations of the 2010 MMB. However,
amendments by the Department to the issue of who would have the
authority to interpret and apply the MMB and the nature of the
mediation process preceding adjudication has caused most of the
ulamā to now treat the 2010 MMB as un-Islamic.
Unlike the 2003 MMB, which proposed that a secular court
comprising a Muslim judge and two Islamic law experts as assessors
should adjudicate opposed matters arising from the MMB, the 2010
MMB does not make any reference to Muslim judges or Islamic law
experts as assessors. As the Indian case of Shah Bano66 teaches us,
many Muslims take the issue of who is authorized to interpret and
adjudicate Islamic law very seriously indeed. This is why the
compromise that the ulamā reached with the SALRC Project
Committee, which required a Muslim judge and Islamic law experts
as assessors to preside over opposed matters, was palatable to the
ulamā. Clauses 15(1) and 16(1) of the 2003 MMB titled “Courts and
assessors” provided:
15(1) If any dispute is referred to a court for
adjudication, the following provisions
shall apply –
(a) the Judge President or other head of the court
which has jurisdiction, shall appoint a Muslim judge
from that court to hear such dispute, and if there is no
Muslim judge, the Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Development shall appoint a duly
admitted practicing Muslim advocate or attorney of at
least 10 years’ standing as acting presiding officer:
Provided that in urgent matters and in cases of an
application under Rule 43 of the High Court Rules, the
matter may be determined by a non-Muslim judge
sitting without assessors;
65. Id. § 1.
66. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India).
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(b) the court shall be assisted by two Muslim assessors
who shall have specialised knowledge of Islamic law.
...
16 (1) In the event of proceedings being instituted
under this Act for the confirmation or grant of a decree
of dissolution of a Muslim marriage or other relief,
and such proceedings are not opposed, or in the event
of the parties having concluded a settlement
agreement, the matter shall be heard by a Muslim
judge sitting without assessors.67
These provisions are creative examples of how religious
plurality could be accommodated within a secular legal framework.
However, the Department removed them from the 2010 MMB
without consulting with the relevant stake-holders. Practical
considerations such as whether or not there are a sufficient number of
Muslim judges within the judiciary and how one would determine
who qualifies as a Muslim judge should not be minimized or
dismissed. Yet, if these issues were cause for concern for the
Department, they should have been revisited with the ulamā and
gender activists who had initially supported the 2003 MMB.
The second issue that has caused the ulamā considerable
trepidation is the conversion of a compulsory mediation process
recommended in the 2003 MMB, to a voluntary mediation process
advocated in the 2010 MMB. The ulamā argue that Islamic law
requires a process preceding the dissolution of a marriage that
involves an attempt at reconciliation through the assistance of two
“arbiters.”68 The authority for this assertion is derived from Qur’ān 4:
35:
If ye fear a breach between them twain, appoint (two)
arbiters, one from his family, and the other from hers;
if they wish for peace, God will cause their

67. SALRC REP., supra note 54, at 127.
68. See id. at 91 (noting that the United Ulama Council, and others, proposed
that the SALRC consider “mandatory mediation and voluntary arbitration, before a
dispute is referred to court, as an integral part of the Bill.”) This proposal was
opposed by the Commission on Gender Equality and the Muslim Youth Movement.
Id.
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reconciliation: for God hath full knowledge, and is
acquainted with all things.69
The change in the form of the mediation process is a serious
breach of the agreement between the ulamā and the SALRC Project
Committee, most likely as a trade off for not establishing a separate
Sharī’a court. The mediation process is probably the forum in which
the ulamā envisaged exercising control over the outcome of disputes.
In both the 2003 and 2010 MMB’s, unless the mediation agreement
between the parties relates to minor children, provision is made that
the court cannot overrule the mediation agreement.70 In fact, the
proposed change in the status of the mediation proceedings has now
given some members of the ulamā the gap to advocate for the
establishment of a parallel Sharī’a Arbitration Forum or Sharī’a
Court over which they would have exclusive power and from which
they could render enforceable orders. Should the Traditional Courts
Bill (TCB)71 be enacted, they would have a strong case to set up a
parallel adjudication system that has the force of law. However,
gender activists have thus far succeeded in preventing the TCB from
being enacted.
A third contentious issue for the ulamā relates to the question of
choice for those Muslims who do not wish to be bound by the
provisions of the legislation. The 2010 MMB recommends that those
who enter into a Muslim marriage after the MMB is enacted must
register their marriage in accordance with the provisions of the MMB
in order for it to regulate their marriage. In contrast, the MMB will
automatically apply to those who enter into a Muslim marriage before
the enactment of the MMB and they will have a prescribed period of
time in which to opt-out of the provisions of the MMB. For those
who choose not to have their marriages regulated by the MMB, the
current legal status of non-recognition that applies to Muslim
marriages will apply to Muslim marriages that are not registered after
the MMB comes into operation:
2 (1) The provisions of this Act apply to Muslim
marriages concluded after the commencement of this
Act where the parties to the marriage elect, in the
prescribed manner, to be bound by the provisions of
this Act.
69. THE HOLY QUR’AN 4:35 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 1946) [hereinafter
QUR’AN].
70. SALRC REP., supra note 54, at 125–26; 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 12.
71. Traditional Courts Bill, 2012, Bill 1-2012 available at http://www.justice.
gov.za/legislation/bills/2012-b01tradcourts.pdf (S. Afr.).
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(2) The provisions of this Act apply to Muslim
marriages concluded before the commencement of this
Act, unless the parties, within a period of 36 months or
such longer period as may be prescribed, as from the
date of the commencement of this Act, jointly elect, in
the prescribed manner, not to be bound by the
provisions of this Act, in which event the provisions of
this Act do not apply to such a marriage.
(3) The law applying to a Muslim marriage in respect
of which the parties have elected not to be bound by
the provisions of this Act, is the law as it was before
this Act came into operation. 72
This is a difficult issue pertaining to the balancing of secular and
religious laws in liberal systems. Individual choice is a fundamental
liberal value. The ulamā would prefer that the opt-in option, which
the MMB proposes for those entering into Muslim marriages after its
enactment, should also be made available to those who are parties to
Muslim marriages prior to the enactment of the MMB. In other
words, the ulamā suggest a reversal of onus where the burden of
opting-out is not placed on Muslim parties. Rather, they should have
the burden of opting-in. If the ulamā’s suggestion is incorporated into
the final legislation, it could potentially prejudice women in existing
Muslim marriages whose husbands are opposed to being bound by
the provisions of the MMB. So the interplay between opt-in and optout becomes a manifestation of the tension between an otherwise
marginalized individual’s right to enjoy the benefits of the proposed
legislation and an individual’s right to exercise her or his right to
religious freedom.
The 2010 MMB also contains several provisions that are
problematic for women’s rights. Besides the limiting definitions of a
Muslim marriage and Islamic law, the MMB includes a conservative
interpretation of khul’a, which prevents women from enjoying an
equal right to divorce:
Khula’ means the dissolution of the marriage bond at
the instance of the wife, in terms of an agreement for
the transfer of property or other permissible

72. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 2.
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consideration between the spouses according to
Islamic law. 73
This definition effectively requires the husband to consent to the
amount that a wife must pay to him to be released from the marriage.
Traditionally, khul’a requires the wife to give back her mahr if it has
been paid to her or waive receiving it if the husband has not yet
paid.74 A progressive interpretation of khul’a incorporated into the
laws of Egypt75 for example, does not require the husband’s consent
regarding the amount that a wife needs to give him to leave the
marriage. This progressive interpretation effectively balances the
husband’s unilateral right to talāq, which requires him to pay any
outstanding mahr when he exercises the talāq. The conservative
interpretation of khul’a reflected in the MMB effectively enables a
husband to prevent his wife from successfully exercising the khul’a.
In addition, neither the 2003 nor 2010 MMB’s make provision for
mubara’a, which is a mutual form of divorce where the husband and
wife agree to no longer be married to each other.
Women’s rights activists have also taken issue with the provision
incorporating the traditional Islamic law rule that spouses must
maintain separate estates when entering marriage, during the
marriage and upon dissolution of the marriage. The 2010 MMB
reads:
8 (1) A Muslim marriage to which this Act applies is
deemed to be a marriage out of community of property
excluding the accrual system, unless the proprietary
consequences governing the marriage are regulated by
73. Id. § 1.
74. Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah, Legislative Provisions & Judicial
Mechanisms for the Enforcement and Termination of the Islamic Marriage
Contract in Malaysia, in THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT: CASE STUDIES IN
ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 190–191 (Asifa Quraishi & Frank E. Vogel eds., 2008) (“In
classical Islamic law [Khul’a] was a divorce by which the wife obtains her
husband’s consent . . . by some sort of compensation (e.g., return of the dower
[mahr])”; Mona Zulficar, The Islamic Marriage Contract in Egypt, in THE ISLAMIC
MARRIAGE CONTRACT: CASE STUDIES IN ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 234 (Asifa
Quraishi & Frank E, Vogel eds., 2008) (“[in Ottoman Egypt] [i]f the wife . . .
wanted a divorce without having to prove fault . . . she had the option of khul’,
divorce agreed by mutual consent . . . [i]n the case of disagreement, she could
automatically obtain a divorce through Khul’ by a court judgment, but usually at
the price of her financial rights to deferred dower.”) The exact nature of Khul’a was
the subject of several submissions to the SALRC. SALRC REP., supra note 54, at
23–24.
75. Law No. 1 of 2000 (Law on the Reorganization of Certain Terms and
Procedures of Litigation in Personal Status Matters) art. 20 (Egypt).
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mutual agreement of the spouses, in an ante nuptial
contract which must be registered in the Deeds
Registry.76
While this traditional rule was introduced in seventh century
Arabia to protect the property of wives, the socio-economic reality of
the twenty-first century is that many Muslim women are left without
financial protection when their marriages end because the bulk of the
marital assets are registered in their husbands’ names. Since a
Muslim marriage is treated as a contract under Islamic law, it would
not be Islamically impermissible to create a default community of
property regime or an out of community of property regime subject to
an accrual system, while affording those Muslims who wish to have
an out of community property regime excluding the accrual system
the opportunity to do so through an antenuptial contract.77
The 2010 MMB further recognizes the single most defining
feature of a Muslim marriage: its potentially polygynous nature. In
clause 8(4)-(7), the MMB enables a husband to take multiple wives.
It seeks to set out the conditions for entering into second and
subsequent marriages:
(4) In the case of a husband who is a spouse in more
than one Muslim marriage, all persons having a
sufficient interest in the matter, and in particular the
husband’s existing spouses, must be joined in the
proceedings.
...
(6) A husband in a Muslim marriage, to which this Act
applies, who wishes to conclude a further Muslim
76. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 8(1).
77. Clause 8(1) of the MMB is consistent with an “out of community of
property regime that excludes the accrual system.” Id. The default matrimonial
property regime under South African law entails one of community of property,
which enables spouses to share equally in a joint estate. The joint estate comprises
their assets that they bring into the marriage and acquire during the subsistence of
the marriage. Spouses can opt out of the default community of property regime by
registering an antenuptial contract that records a choice to enter into an out of
community of property regime that either includes or excludes the accrual system.
The accrual system enables spouses to enter the marriage with separate estates, to
maintain separate estates during the marriage, but to share in the accrual of their
estates when the marriage ends in divorce or death. Cf. Matrimonial Property Act
88 of 1984.
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(a) for approval to conclude a further Muslim marriage
in terms of subsection (7); and
(b) for approval of a written contract which will
regulate the future matrimonial property system of his
marriages.
(7)(a) When considering the application in terms of
subsection (6), the court must grant approval if it is
satisfied that the husband is able to maintain equality
between his spouses as is prescribed by the Holy
Qur’an. 78
A strict application of the above provisions will permit a
husband to take a maximum of four wives, which accords with the
mainstream understanding of Islamic law.79
To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical data on the
extent of polygyny among Muslims in South Africa, itself a
consequence of those marriages taking place outside the framework
of state law and registration. There is, however, some research that
reveals that many South African Muslim women are not in favour of
polygyny.80 This study is based on a sample of married Muslim
women living in Cape Town. Approximately 4% of the participants
of that study had husbands who had taken second wives.81 Three
quarters of the women participants said they would be unhappy or
very unhappy if their husbands were to enter into second or
subsequent marriages.82 In addition, 71% said that they would

78. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 8(4–7).
79. See QUR’AN, supra note 69, at 4:3 (“Marry women of your choice, two, or
three, or four.”).
80. S. Shaikh et al., South African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and
Reproductive Choices, Research Report, 31 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 96 (2001). For more
empirical data on Muslim marriages in difficulty, through divorce, polygyny, and
spousal abuse, see Mogamat Yoesrie Toefy, Divorce in the Muslim Community of
the Western Cape: a Demographic Study of 600 Divorce Records at the Muslim
Judicial Council and National Ulama Council between 1994 and 1999 (2001)
(unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Cape Town) (on file with author);
SINDRE BANGSTAD, GLOBAL FLOWS, LOCAL APPROPRIATIONS: FACETS OF
SECULARISATION AND RE-ISLAMIZATION AMONG CONTEMPORARY CAPE MUSLIMS
(2007).
81. Shaikh et al., supra note 80, at 15.
82. Id. at 16.
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separate from or divorce their husbands if they actually took a second
wife.83
Although the recommended recognition of polygyny could give
rise to a constitutional challenge on the basis of gender and sex since
the same right to enter into polygynous marriages is not afforded to
women, the Constitutional Court has indicated that it will entertain a
reasonable accommodation of religious practices84 The protective
mechanisms recommended in the MMB to deal with polygyny may
lead the Constitutional Court to conclude that the interests of Muslim
women are sufficiently protected thus potentially amounting to a
reasonable accommodation of the religious practice. For example, a
husband would be required to apply to court for approval of the
contract that will regulate his subsequent marriage; an existing wife
would have to be joined in the proceedings, which would afford her
the opportunity to provide a view on the proposed marriage; and the
husband would have to show that he would be “able to maintain
equality between his spouses.” 85 This is the approach that was taken
in the legislation regulating polygynous African customary
marriages.86 The only difference is that the MMB tailors the
requirement of “equality between his spouses” to the Qur’ānic
understanding of equality in an attempt to be accommodative of
Islamic nuances pertaining to polygyny. Several English translations
of Qur’ān 4:3, which is the verse that arguably permits polygyny in
Islam, suggest that a husband is only permitted to take more than one
wife if he can ensure that it will not result in injustice between his
wives.87 The condition of equality within the context of polygyny as
provided for in the MMB may therefore be interpreted within the
parameters of the wives being treated justly. This may not necessarily
equate to absolute equality between the wives if a measure of
inequality between them still results in justice being served.
Of the many Islamic law rights and practices that the 2010 MMB
incorporates, not all are proactively encouraged by all the members
of the South African ulamā even though they would not deny their
83. Id. at 109.
84. Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education, 2000 (4) SA
757 (CC) at para. 51 (S. Afr.).
85. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 8(7).
86. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
87. See Verse (4:3) - English Translation, QURANIC ARABIC CORPUS,
http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=4&verse=3 (last visited May 10,
2014) (showing seven parallel translations of the Arabic text).
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authenticity as Islamically recognized rights and obligations. Some of
those rights that benefit women have already been mentioned. These
include the wife’s right to be compensated for breastfeeding; her
services rendered in her husband’s or his family’s business; the
husband’s obligation to provide his ex-wife with accommodation
while the children are in her custody; and a spouse’s right to be
compensated for her or his direct contributions to the other’s estate.88
At the same time, the 2010 MMB does not include all the Sunni
rights that are available to women in marriage. For instance, a wife
has an Islamic law right to be compensated for her labour in the
home, which the MMB does not provide for.
When it comes to issues relating to the guardianship, custody of,
or access to, a minor child born of the Muslim marriage, an attempt is
made to ensure consistency with the secular principle of the best
interests of the child while maintaining deference to Islamic law:
10 (1) In making an order for the custody of, or access
to a minor child, or in making a decision on
guardianship, the court must, with due regard to
Islamic law and the report and recommendations of
the Family Advocate, which must take into account
Islamic norms and values, consider the welfare and
best interests of the child. 89
The concern is that a conservative interpretation of Islamic laws
relating to guardianship, custody of, and access to, minor children
could militate against women and infringe their right to gender
equality. For instance, a traditional Sunni approach only recognizes a
right of guardianship in favour of men if the child is born within
wedlock. Furthermore, a mother only has limited rights of custody
especially in relation to her son. The Sunni Māliki school allows a
mother to have custody of her male child until he becomes pubescent
and the Sunni Hanafī and Shāfi’ī schools only enable a mother to
have custody of her male child until he is seven years old. 90 In the
case of female children, the Hanafī school permits the mother to
retain custody until her daughter reaches puberty while the Shāfi’ī
and Māliki schools allow the mother to have custody until her

88. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 9(8)(b).
89. Id. § 10(1).
90. Sherman A. Jackson, Kramer versus Kramer in a Tenth/Sixth Century
Egyptian Court: Post-Formative Jurisprudence between Exigency and Law, 8
ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y. 27, 33–34 n.25 (2001).
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daughter is married. However, if the mother marries another man, she
loses all custodial rights over her children.91
The synopsis of the MMB presented in the previous paragraphs
illustrates that if either version of the MMB is enacted, it will result
in the codification of a parallel religious-based family law system. On
the one hand, this could enable Muslim women to access Islamic law
rights through a secular framework. On the other hand, this could just
as easily entrench gender-based discriminatory rules within the
secular legal system.
In the absence of legislation enabling both Muslim women and
men to assert their Islamic law rights arising from their Muslim
marriages, all is not lost. Since the introduction of South Africa’s
democratic constitutional dispensation in 1994, the judiciary has
provided some relief. In the next section, we consider how the post1994 judiciary has approached the issue of Muslim marriages.
V. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The judiciary under the colonial and apartheid states refused to
recognize potentially polygynous marriages on the basis that they
were contra bonos mores or against their understanding of public
policy.92 However, in the groundbreaking case of Ryland v. Edros,93
which was decided in 1997, the Cape High Court (as it then was) for
the first time in the history of South Africa rejected the colonial and
apartheid interpretations of public policy in the context of marriage.
The Court held that public policy prior to the introduction of a
constitutional democracy in South Africa had been informed by the
presumed views of only one section of South African society.94 The
Court found that it was:
“[I]nimical to all the values of the new South Africa
for one group to impose its values on another and that
91. E.g., JOHN L. ESPOSITO & NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN IN MUSLIM
FAMILY LAW 35 (2001).
92. Bronn v. Frits Bronn’s Executors and Others 1860 (3) SC 313 (CSC) (S.
Afr.); Seedat’s Executors v. The Master (Natal) 1917 A.D. 302; Estate Mehta v.
Acting Master, High Court 1958 (4) SA 252 (F.C.) (S. Afr.); Kader v. Kader Bronn
v. Frits Bronn’s Executors and Others 1860 (3) SC 313 (CSC) (S. Afr.); Seedat’s
Executors v. The Master (Natal) 1917 A.D. 302; Estate Mehta v. Acting Master,
High Court 1958 (4) SA 252 (F.C.) (S. Afr.); Kader v. Kader 1972 (3) SA 203 (R.,
A.D.) (S. Afr.); Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) (R., AD) (S. Afr.).
93. 1997 (2) SA 690 (CC) (S. Afr.).
94. Id. at 707 G.
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the Courts should only brand a [marriage] contract as
offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those
values which are shared by the community at large, by
all right-thinking people in the community and not
only by one section of it.”95
The Court emphasized that “the values of equality and tolerance
of diversity and the recognition of the plural nature of our society are
among the values that underlie our Constitution.”96 Consequently, in
paying tribute to the multicultural nature of South African society
that is now defined by the constitutional values promoting equality
between groups and an acceptance of diversity, the Court recognized
a monogamous Muslim marriage as a contract that is enforceable
under South African law. In particular, the Court granted the wife’s
claim for spousal maintenance and mut’ah al-talāq.97 The Court did
not grant the wife’s claim for an equitable share of her tangible
and intangible contributions to the growth of her husband’s estate
because no evidence had been presented to confirm that such a
practice was prevalent within the Muslim community in which the
parties had been members.98
Following the example set by the Court in Ryland, a growing
trend has emerged within the judiciary to afford recognition to proven
terms and customs arising from the Muslim marriage contract. In
fact, subsequent to Ryland, the judiciary has on a case-by-case basis
enforced Islamic law obligations through secular or civil legislation.
For instance, in 1999, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Amod
v. Multilateral Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commissioner for Gender
Equality Intervening)99 accepted the unilateral obligation of a
husband to support his wife in a monogamous Muslim marriage as a
duty that was worthy of recognition and respect under the law.100 As
a result, the Islamic maintenance obligation of the husband in a
monogamous Muslim marriage was given expression through the
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989, which
enabled the Muslim wife of the deceased Muslim husband to benefit
as his dependant.101 Thereafter, in 2005, in the case of Khan v.
Khan,102 the Transvaal Provincial Division (as it then was) extended
95. Id. at 707 F.
96. Id. at 708 I.
97. Id. at 718 I.
98. Id. at 717 H, 719 A.
99. 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
100. Id. at 1329–30 para. 23.
101. Id. at 1320–21.
102. 2005 (2) SA 272 (T) at (281–283) (S. Afr.).
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recognition of a Muslim wife’s right to spousal maintenance to
instances of polygyny, and permitted the polygynous Muslim wife to
enforce her maintenance claim against her husband through the
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998.103 More recently, the right of a Muslim
wife to access rule 43 of the Uniform Rules of Court was recognized,
enabling her to claim interim maintenance and custody of and access
to her minor child/ren born of the Muslim marriage pending
finalization of her claim to have the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 apply to
the dissolution of her Muslim marriage.104 In the cases dealing with
the rule 43 application, the parties settled out of court so the judiciary
did not have the opportunity to indicate whether or not it would have
granted the wives’ claims to regulate the dissolution of their Muslim
marriages through the secular or civil divorce legislation.
The judiciary has also interpreted the word “spouse” in certain
secular or civil legislation to include or extend to Muslim spouses so
that the latter can enjoy the benefits of the legislation. For instance, in
Daniels v. Campbell NO and Others105 and Fatima Gabie Hassam v.
Johan Hermanus Jacobs NO and Others,106 the Constitutional Court
permitted Muslim spouses respectively in monogamous and
polygynous Muslim marriages to be treated as intestate heirs for the
purpose of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 and to claim
maintenance from their deceased spouses’ estates under the
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990.
Despite the judiciary’s willingness to recognize and enforce
proven terms and customs of the Muslim marriage contract, it has not
been prepared to recognize the marriage itself as valid. Instead, it has
taken the view that wholesale recognition of Muslim marriages is
best left to the legislature to address.107 This appears to be in line with
the judiciary’s hesitance to involve itself in matters of religious
doctrine.108 Provided that no interpretation relating to religious
doctrine is required, the judiciary is happy to recognize proven rights
and obligations emanating from the Muslim marriage contract. Yet,
this may be a somewhat artificial distinction drawn by the judiciary.
103. See also Cassim v. Cassim, No. 3954/06 (S. Afr. TPD, Dec. 15, 2006).
104. Mahomed v. Mahomed, No. 2154/08 (S. Afr. ECP, May 29, 2009);
Hoosain v. Dangor, No. 18141/09, (S. Afr. WCC, Nov. 18, 2009).
105. 2005 (5) SA 331 (CC) at 341–42, 349–50 (S. Afr.).
106. 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC) at 589, 593–94 (S. Afr.).
107. Amod v. Multilateral Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319, at
1331–32 para. 28 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
108. Ryland v. Edros 1997 (4) LRC 70 (ICHRL) at 703 E–F (S. Afr.).
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For instance, by recognizing certain aspects of the Muslim marriage
contract and not recognizing others, as happened in the Ryland case
where the Court rejected the wife’s claim for an equitable distribution
of her husband’s estate, the judiciary ends up involving itself in
religious doctrine even though it may not be engaging in direct
interpretation of the religion.109
The judiciary has played a significant role in the last 17 years by
affording reprieve to especially vulnerable and marginalized Muslim
women. However, the limitation of judicial intervention in the area of
Muslim marriages is that it can only provide ad hoc relief. So it is
understandable that the failure to legislate Muslim marriages appears
to be causing some frustration to the judiciary as expressed in the
most recent case, namely, Faro v. Bingham NO and Others.110 The
wife in the Faro case asked that Muslim marriages be deemed valid
under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 or that the common law definition
of marriage be extended to include Muslim marriages.111 In other
words, she asked that a Muslim marriage be treated as a secular or
civil marriage. The Western Cape High Court postponed judgment on
this claim until August 20, 2014, and has given the Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development until July 15, 2014 to report
on the progress of the Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB).112 Should
there not be any significant development on the MMB by that date,
one wonders if the judiciary will depart from its previous reluctance
to afford legal recognition to Muslim marriages and allow it to be
given validity through the Marriage Act? That may put the MMB to
rest once and for all. But it would still not solve the problem of
ensuring a religious divorce at the behest of a Muslim wife in
situations where their husbands refuse to grant one. This latter
problem is unfortunately a global one in countries with Muslim
minorities. Thus far, no solution to that particular problem is in sight,
short of enacting legislation regulating religious divorce as is the case
in India.113 In other words, there seems to be no escaping the need to
legislate.

109. Amien, supra note 7, at 738.
110. Faro v. Bingham, No. 4466/2013 (S. Afr. WCC 25 Oct. 2013),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2013/159.html.
111. Id. at 7–8 para. 19. The common law definition of marriage is “the legally
recognized voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of
all others while it lasts.” Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (AD) at 1019 H (S. Afr.).
112. Id. at 21–23 para. 47.
113. Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, Act. 8, Acts of Parliament,
1939 (India).
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VI. THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
There are a number of different types of marriages in South
Africa, namely, secular or civil marriages, customary marriages, and
civil partnerships. It could be useful to compare them in thinking
about the role of religion and its relation to the state and legislature.
Secular or civil marriages are regulated by the Marriage Act 25
of 1961, which legislates for marriage between a man and a woman,
and allows for marriage officers of different religious and humanist
persuasions.114 In particular, it enables a person who solemnizes or
officiates inter alia Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish marriages
to be registered as a marriage officer. This means that when an imām
who is designated as a marriage officer, performs a Muslim marriage,
he or she can simultaneously register a secular or civil marriage.
Alternatively, a Muslim couple could enter into a secular or civil
marriage in addition to their Muslim marriage. In these ways, they
could access the benefits attaching to secular or civil marriages.
However, very few Muslims enter into secular or civil marriages.
Prior to 1994, the reason was mainly political in that entering into a
secular or civil marriage was construed as an act of collaboration
with an unjust state. After 1994, the reason centred on the religiosity
of the marriage. Many imāms viewed secular or civil marriages as
unIslamic because they did not permit polygyny and encompassed a
default matrimonial regime of community of property. The latter is at
odds with the mainstream Islamic law approach, which requires a
complete separation of the spouses’ properties. Thus, most South
African imāms discouraged their congregations from entering into
secular or civil marriages and very few allowed themselves to be
registered as marriage officers.
However, as recently as May 1, 2014, the Department of Home
Affairs announced that they had registered more than 100 imāms as
marriage officers.115 This appears to have been an electioneering
strategy to elicit Muslim votes for the May 7, 2014 national elections.
The issue of recognition of Muslim marriages tends to surface every
five years during the general elections period when politicians use the
Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB) to canvass for Muslim votes. This
time, they employed a different strategy and got a significant number
of imāms to be registered as marriage officers thereby conveying the
114. Marriage Act 25 of 1961 § 3(1) (S. Afr.).
115. Minister Welcomes Move to Legal Status, CAPE TIMES (South Africa),
May 1, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 11666067.
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message to the Muslim community that secular or civil marriages are
now an Islamically permissible option for them.116 It is still unclear
how the Department managed to obtain buy-in from the very imāms
who had previously denounced secular or civil marriages. If one were
to hazard a calculated guess, one could surmise that the imāms may
have been persuaded that they would not be precluded from
officiating polygynous marriages provided the latter are not
registered under the Marriage Act and they could opt to perform
secular or civil marriages where the parties have concluded an antenuptial contract regulating their matrimonial regimes as out of
community of property. In fact, some imāms have announced that
they will only register secular or civil marriages in cases where
couples have the aforementioned ante-nuptial contract.
The precise implications of this recent occurrence of the
registration of imāms is yet to be determined. At this point, it raises
the following questions: Will more Muslims now be motivated to
enter into secular or civil marriages? How will the rights of
polygynous wives in unregistered marriages weigh against the rights
of wives in secular or civil marriages? Will those Muslims who enter
into secular or civil marriages still be able to assert their rights
emanating from their Muslim marriage? Will Muslims entering into
secular or civil marriages obfuscate the need for enactment of
legislation to recognize Muslim marriages? As mentioned in the
previous section, if the wife wishes to dissolve the marriage through
divorce, a secular or civil divorce will not guarantee a religious
divorce. For this, she will still need legislation to recognize and
regulate Islamic forms of divorce. Alternatively, the ulamā would
have to accept a secular or civil divorce as sufficient to dissolve the
Muslim marriage. But is the South African ulamā anywhere near
ready for such a radical interpretation of what could qualify as a valid
Muslim divorce?
In contrast to secular or civil marriages, the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) legislates marriages
concluded under African custom and provides for polygyny in law.117
The most recent legislation is the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, which
legislates civil partnerships, including same-sex couples. 118
116. Id. (noting that 117 imams were qualified as marriage officers).
117. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § 2 (S. Afr.).
118. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). But see Henriét De Ru, The
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006: A Transformative Act or a Substandard Product of a
Failed Conciliation Between Social, Legal and Political Issues?, 73 J. CONTEMP.
ROMAN-DUTCH L. 553, 567–68 (2010) (criticizing the drafting of the Act).

542

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:505

Unlike the MMB, attempts to legislate customary marriages
were effected early in the term of the ANC government. In 1997, the
South African Law Commission (SALC) proposed legislation to
recognize customary marriages. The SALC argued that “in certain
areas, spouses should be free to follow their cultural preferences as
guaranteed in sections 30 and 31 of the 1996 Constitution,” which
respectively protect the rights to language and culture and as noted
previously, of cultural, religious and linguistic communities.119 The
SALC therefore proposed legislation that would recognize both
polygynous and monogamous customary marriages, but altered the
terms of the marriage contract in such a way that would strengthen
women’s entitlements. For instance, it recommended that a husband
who intends to enter into a polygynous customary marriage must
apply to court for approval of the written contract of the subsequent
marriage and that existing wives be joined in the proceedings.120
The SALC also suggested that some rules should apply to all
marriages: consent of both parties; minimum legal age of consent;
legal equivalence between the parties to a marriage; and some of the
same terms for divorce. This explains the great degree of similarity
among the provisions of the different marriage legislation. To use the
RCMA as an example, with the exception of a few features particular
to customary marriages such as lobolo, polygyny, and the recognition
of customary marriage payments, the bulk of the RCMA is a
reflection of the Marriage Act. This includes the default matrimonial
property regime of community of property and dissolution of the
customary marriage being regulated by the Divorce Act. Clearly
these attempts at assimilation were to enable equality between the
spouses. However, one of the criticisms leveled at the attempt to
achieve consistency between the RCMA and secular or civil marriage
and divorce legislation is that assimilation is normatively problematic
because it sets the secular or civil marriage legislation as the standard
to which customary marriages must comply.121 It also introduces
119. J. Mahomed et. al., Harmonisation of the Common Law and the
Indigenous Law 2 (S. Afr. Law Comm’n, Project 90, Issue Paper No. 3, 1996)
(“Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution entitle both individuals and groups to
practise and participate in the cultural life of their choice, which would include the
right to live by customary law. Thus, while some rules should apply to all
marriages, in certain areas spouses should be free to follow their cultural
preferences.”), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip03_prj90_199
7.pdf.
120. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, supra note 117, § 7.
121. Amien, supra note 34, at 381.
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practical problems of implementation when the requirements of the
Marriage Act, which have been subsumed into the RCMA, cannot be
enforced because they are unfamiliar to the intended beneficiaries
and do not take their lived realities into account. For example,
applying to a third party to take a second or subsequent wife is not
traditional practice for those who enter into customary marriages.
Thus, in many instances, the applications as required by the RCMA
are simply not made and husbands proceed to enter into polygynous
marriages as they did prior to the enactment of the RCMA.
Furthermore, a large percentage of the black African population who
enter into customary marriages reside in the rural areas of South
Africa.122 So even in those instances where husbands do make
application to court to enter into a subsequent marriage, existing
wives in rural areas find it too expensive to travel to court to make
their voices heard.123 Thus, the envisioned protections incorporated
into the legislation are lost on the intended beneficiaries.
In contrast, most of the MMB proposes to recognize and regulate
specific features of Muslim family law that are not unfamiliar to the
South African Muslim community. There is far less assimilation with
secular or civil marriage legislation regarding the features and
requirements for marriage in the MMB than is reflected in the
RCMA. The MMB displays more of an effort on the part of
government to be sensitive to the needs and expectations of the
minority Muslim community. To the extent that consistency between
the MMB and secular or civil marriage legislation is evident, it
appears to be mainly for the purpose of achieving administrative
expediency. For instance, the requirement that the Family Advocates
Office make recommendations in respect of any minor children born
of the Muslim marriage is similarly expected in the case of secular or
civil marriages and African customary marriages. Even then, the
requirement is tailored to conform to Islamic law by expecting the
Family Advocate to “take into account Islamic norms and values.”124
There is a productive comparison to be made across the different
forms of marriage and the legal, political, and popular deliberations
around their recognition. One comparison reveals the consequences
of differences in institutional position and legal entitlement between
122. Debbie Budlender et al., Marriage Patterns in South Africa:
Methodological and Substantive Issues, 9 S. AFR. J. DEMOGRAPHY 1, 17 (2004).
123. Chuma Himonga, The Advancement Of African Women’s Rights In The
First Decade Of Democracy In South Africa: The Reform of the Customary Law of
Marriage and Succession, ACTA JURIDICA COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 82, 85
(2005).
124. 2010 MMB, supra note 57, § 10(1).
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religious and traditional bodies. Many of the issues that drafters faced
in reconciling religious and traditional marriages and substantive
gender equality are shared between customary and Muslim personal
laws. They include polygyny, grounds for divorce, custody,
inheritance, division of marital estates at divorce, consent, age of
consent, and women’s legal standing in marriage contracts. As
observed previously, the legislation drafted for customary and
Muslim marriages treat some of these issues in similar ways, with a
core secular or civil law component that prioritizes equality, and
others that make provision for gender differentiation according to
religion and tradition. There are further similarities. Women married
under customary and Muslim rites were prejudiced by the nonrecognition of their marriages. Men claiming authority over their
traditions—ulamā and traditional leaders respectively—contested the
authority of the state to transform their traditions. In both cases, an
alliance of progressive religionists and traditionalists contested their
patriarchal authority in the name of transformation of tradition and
gender equality. Both law making processes began in the early years
of democracy and therefore under similar national political
conditions. Yet, one concluded soon after its commencement and the
other has still not been finalized.
When it came to developing customary marriage legislation, the
lawmakers followed due process, took comments into account,
framed a compromise, yet acted against the wishes of the vast
majority of traditional leaders and gender advocates in passing the
RCMA. The National and Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders
had, on the whole, been extremely critical of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Bill (RCMA Bill).125 The Commission on
Gender Equality (CGE), which organized a consultation process with
rural African women, was also critical, particularly of the provisions
on polygyny.126 The question of how to deal with polygyny was
central to the RCMA Bill. As Cheryl Gillwald, then Deputy Minister
of Justice and Constitutional Development said at the launch of the
RCMA that the polygyny was not banned because such a ban “would
be almost impossible to enforce and the popularity of the practice

125. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
126. COMM’N ON GENDER EQUALITY, RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY
MARRIAGES BILL SUBMISSION TO JUSTICE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE (1998),
available at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/1998/980929cge.htm (The commission
“rejects the practice of polygamy and regards such practice as discriminatory.”).
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seems to be waning.”127 Despite this, Budlender and others calculate
that 7% of married African women report “that their husbands have
other wives beside themselves.”128 Lack of support for the RCMA
Bill notwithstanding, the Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development pushed it through Parliament and the RCMA was
enacted in 1998.129
When it came to developing Muslim marriage legislation, the
SALRC began in a similar way. They formed a consultative body that
included a variety of opinions among Muslims, followed due process,
took comments into account and then framed a compromise.
However, they did not act against the wishes of those Muslims who
were opposed to the compromise. Instead, they acknowledged the
autonomy of the “Muslim community” in deciding on this matter.
They gave cognisance to the idea of the sacred authority of the
Qur’ān and were unwilling to codify elements of scripture in
opposition to its claimed authoritative interpretation. But it was only
by withdrawing from the legislative process that they could do this.
How then to explain the different outcomes between the
processes relating to the enactment of the RCMA and the still
pending enactment of the MMB, which is causing Muslim marriages
to continue to operate outside the ambit of state law? The difference
is a direct result of relations between the state and religious and
traditional bodies respectively. In the case of customary law, it was
codified by colonial administrators, legislated by apartheid
administrators, and now again, codified through the RCMA. In other
words, the institution of traditional leadership and customary law
were part of the state and its law. As such, they are uniquely subject
to legislative development, and therefore, to the equality provisions.
They do not have autonomy from the state.
What then of MPL? The ideas of religious autonomy,
conscience, and a separation of powers and domains have been
central to the development of secularism. These ideas were defended
by both the ANC and religious groups in the negotiations. The
constitutional right to religion includes the right to the integrity of
conscience. Religious organizations as institutions of civil society
have the right to autonomous ecclesiastical and theological control
127. Boshadi Nkomo, South Africa: New Customary Marriages Act Sees
Women
as
Equal
Partners,
WOZA,
(Nov.
16,
2000),
http://allafrica.com/stories/2000111603
52.html.
128. Budlender et al., supra note 122, at 17.
129. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
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over their internal rules and regulations. Religious groups sought
separation from the state so that their ecclesiastical and theological
control could remain autonomous. As long as a social practice or
institution does not seek the authorization of the state; as long as noone takes this practice to court; and as long as an organization can
claim to be a religion with a domain of autonomy through conscience
or sacred authority, the state has not legislated religious practices to
bring them in line with equality provisions. But the moment a
practice or institution falls under the rubric of legislation, equality
becomes an issue. The ordination of women in church, for example,
is a matter of ecclesiastical and theological autonomy. Unless
someone takes it to court, and perhaps even then, the state is unlikely
to intervene. On the contrary, access of women to chieftainship, for
example, has been both proactively legislated and contested in
court.130 It seems that the state is more inclined to intervene when the
conduct or practice is cultural rather than religious in nature.
The above examples of marriage legislation also point to the
different avenues open for the legislation of majoritarian and
countermajoritarian demands. Unpopular demands for equality that
are in opposition to public opinion have been taken to court. This is
most clear in the advancement of equal rights for gay and lesbian
people who won their demands through the courts.131 It put enormous
pressure on the ANC at a time when it sought to defend itself against
claims of immorality. It is clear that the executive branch of the ANC
had to override the “popular” will represented in the views of
members of parliament to support the Civil Union Act. The question
of Muslim marriages on the other hand, which affects a small
minority, has been dealt with in specially established forums of
lawyers and specialists. The state has not yet been willing to
intervene to force a resolution in favour of one or another position.
CONCLUSION
The South African example presenting an attempt to legislate a
religious marriage regime in a secular democracy points to many
130. See Shilubana and Others v. Nwamitwa, 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) at 70 para.
3 (S. Afr.) (involving a challenge to the principle of male primogeniture in the
selection of a new chief).
131. See generally Nat’l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another
v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.); Nat’l Coalition for
Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000
(2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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tensions in the place of religion under law. The South African Bill of
Rights guarantees a right of religious freedom. It also limits and
frames this right. Turning a right into a legislative and social reality is
a far more complex and ambivalent process. As we have shown, the
success of such a process depends on the levels of consensus among
religious representatives, claims to religious legitimacy and authority,
negotiations between public and private presence of religion, and
political will in relation to religious minorities.
The tension between secular or civil recognition of Muslim
marriages as contracts in the courts and the non-recognition of
Muslim marriages under legislation is increasing. It will be
interesting to watch developments in this area over the next few
months or years. Whichever way the process goes, it is clear that
there is a process of de-facto secularization of Muslim marriages
recognized as a secular or civil contract. This goes some way towards
removing the exceptionalism of religious systems of law. As an
increasingly large body of literature shows, any legal recognition of
religious law is at the same time a process of its reformulation.

